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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case  
 Justin Lynn McCallum appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of lewd conduct with a minor under 16 
and felony destruction of evidence, from the district court’s order revoking his 
probation and executing the sentence previously imposed upon his conviction for 
aiding and abetting the delivery of a controlled substance, and from the district 
court’s order denying his I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 In November 2011, the Elmore County Sheriff’s Office received 
information that McCallum and his cousin were using and selling marijuana.  
(2/14/13 PSI, p.3; R., Vol. I, pp.14-15.)   The Sheriff’s Office utilized a confidential 
informant to make four separate marijuana purchases from McCallum’s cousin.  
(2/14/13 PSI, p.3; R., Vol. I, pp.14-15.)  McCallum was present at two of these 
transactions.  (R., Vol. I, pp.14-15.)    
The state charged McCallum with two counts of aiding and abetting 
delivery of a controlled substance and misdemeanor possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  (R., Vol. I, pp.52-53.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, McCallum 
pled guilty to one count of aiding and abetting delivery, and the state agreed to 
dismiss the remaining counts.  (R., Vol. I pp.65-66, 68-71.)  In February 2013, the 
district court imposed a unified four-year sentence with one year fixed, but 
suspended the sentence and placed McCallum on probation for three years.  (R., 
Vol. I, pp.75-79.)     
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 In January 2014, the parents of 13-year-old A.M. found out that she was 
using marijuana and distributing pills to friends.  (Trial Tr., p.140, Ls.2-3; p.142, 
L.8 – p.143, L.8.)  A.M.’s parents grounded her and made her go to Narcotics 
Anonymous meetings for several months.  (Trial Tr., p.143, Ls.6-23; p.195, Ls.7-
20.)  There, A.M. met McCallum.  (Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.5-7.)  After developing a 
close relationship, McCallum asked A.M. to send him nude photos of her.  (Trial 
Tr., p.145, L.5 – p.149, L.9.)   
 On July 5, 2014, A.M. was staying at her grandmother’s house.  (Trial Tr., 
p.153, Ls.22-24.)  That night, following a text exchange with McCallum, A.M. 
snuck out of her grandmother’s house and went to McCallum’s house.  (Trial Tr., 
p.155, L.8 – p.156, L.11.)  There, McCallum had sex with A.M. in his yard.  (Trial 
Tr., p.158, L.25 – p.169, L.10.)  Over the next few weeks, McCallum continued to 
exchange flirtatious and sexually explicit text messages with A.M.  (Trial Tr., 
p.171, L.23 – p.176, L.3; State’s Exhibits 1, 4-8.) 
 Shortly after the final text exchange between McCallum and A.M., A.M.’s 
mother took A.M.’s cell phone from her.  (Trial Tr., p.176, L.4 – p.177, L.18; 
p.199, Ls.21-23.)  Knowing that her phone contained sexually explicit text 
messages exchanged between her and McCallum, A.M. told her mother and 
step-father that she had sex with McCallum.  (Trial Tr., p.178, L.1 – p.179, L.22; 
p.201, Ls.7-23.)  McCallum’s mother read the text messages and then called the 
police.  (Trial Tr., p.202, L.4 – p.204, L.14.) 
  Officers met with A.M. and took possession of her cell phone.  (Trial Tr., 
p.238, L.17 – p.240, L.9.)  Another officer, Sgt. Russell Griggs, made contact with 
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McCallum by phone.  (Trial Tr., p.246, L.21 – p.252, L.1.)  Sgt. Griggs informed 
McCallum, who was on felony probation for the delivery charge at the time, that 
he needed to turn over his cell phone to law enforcement.  (Id.)  On July 24, 
2014, after Sgt. Griggs contacted McCallum about his phone, McCallum informed 
his probation officer that he had a new phone number.  (Trial Tr., p.231, L.14 – 
p.232, L.18.)   
Sgt. Griggs eventually recovered McCallum’s cell phone.  (Trial Tr., p.255, 
Ls.9-24.)  McCallum told Sgt. Griggs that he had done a factory reset on the 
phone, resulting in the deletion of the phone’s contents, prior to handing it over to 
law enforcement.  (Trial Tr., p.256, L.16 – p.257, L.23.)  Later at trial, Sgt. Griggs 
would testify that McCallum told him that he performed the factory reset after he 
had lost the phone at a lake, and “something to the effect of because of the girl 
thing and [because] people are trying to get him back in to the drug and alcohol 
scene.”  (Trial Tr., p.258, Ls.12-21.)  Officers were able to recover numerous text 
messages sent between McCallum and A.M. from A.M.’s phone, and were able 
to obtain McCallum’s cell phone records through Verizon Wireless.  (State’s 
Exhibits 1-11; Trial Tr., p.301, L.14 – p.324, L.6.)   
The state charged McCallum with lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and 
felony destruction of evidence.  (R, Vol. II, pp.229-230.)  The state also filed a 
motion for probation violation in McCallum’s delivery case.  (R., Vol. I, pp.91-
127.)  The state alleged that McCallum violated his probation by committing the 
new crimes of lewd conduct and destruction of evidence, failing to obtain a 
treatment sponsor, failing to maintain employment or complete the required 
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number of employment contacts, and associating with individuals with a history of 
illegal drug use without permission.  (R., Vol. I, pp.91-93.) 
 Prior to McCallum’s trial for lewd conduct and destruction of evidence, the 
state filed a notice of intent to introduce I.R.E. 404(b) evidence at the trial.  (R., 
Vol. II, pp.257-270, 281-301.)  Among the evidence the state sought to admit 
were various text messages between McCallum and A.M. sent in June and July 
2014.  (Id.)  McCallum objected to the admission of the text messages.  (6/19/15 
Tr., p.31, Ls.20-25.)  The district court concluded that the text messages were 
admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) because they were relevant for purposes other 
than demonstrating criminal propensity; and that the probative value of the 
messages was not substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice 
pursuant to I.R.E. 403.  (6/19/15 Tr., p.32, L.1 – p.33, L.10.)   The district court 
qualified its ruling by noting that the state still had to lay adequate foundation for 
the text messages, and that a limiting instruction might be appropriate.  (Id.) 
 At trial, the state successfully admitted the text messages into evidence.  
(State’s Exhibits 1, 4-11.)  A.M. testified at trial about her relationship with 
McCallum and about her sexual activity with McCallum that occurred on July 5-6, 
2014.  (Trial Tr., p.139, L.3 – p.193, L.11.)  The jury found McCallum guilty of 
both lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and felony destruction of evidence.  (R., 
Vol. II, pp.375-376.)  At an evidentiary hearing conducted after the trial but before 
the sentencing hearing, McCallum admitted to violating his probation in the 
delivery case.  (R., Vol. I, p.172.)   
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The district court imposed a unified 25-year sentence with five years fixed 
for lewd conduct, and a concurrent five-year fixed sentence for felony destruction 
of evidence.  (R., Vol. II, pp.386-389.)  The district court also revoked McCallum’s 
probation in the delivery case and ordered his original sentence executed, to run 
concurrently with his sentences for lewd conduct and felony destruction of 
evidence.  (R., Vol. I, pp.176-181.)  Approximately three months later, the district 
court denied McCallum’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence.  (R., Vol. 
II, pp.414-420.)   
 McCallum timely appealed from both the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of lewd conduct and felony destruction of 
evidence, and from the district court’s order revoking his probation and executing 
the sentence previously imposed upon his conviction for aiding and abetting the 
delivery of a controlled substance.  (R., Vol. I, pp.182-185; Vol. II, pp.398-401.)  
The Idaho Supreme Court consolidated these two cases for appeal.  (12/3/15 
Order.) 
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ISSUES 
 McCallum states the issues on appeal as:  
 
1. Is there sufficient evidence to support the conviction for 
felony destruction of evidence? 
 
2. Did the district court err in admitting irrelevant text 
messages? 
 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
McCallum’s probation in the delivery case? 
 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion in sentencing Mr. 
McCallum to twenty-five years fixed, following his conviction 
for lewd conduct and felony destruction of evidence? 
 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
McCallum’s Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.8) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has McCallum failed to demonstrate that the state presented insufficient 
evidence to support his conviction for felony destruction of evidence? 
 
2. Has McCallum failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
discretion by admitting the text messages into evidence? 
 
3. Does the doctrine of invited error preclude McCallum’s contention that the 
district court abused its discretion by revoking probation and executing the 
sentence previously imposed upon his conviction for aiding and abetting 
the delivery of a controlled substance? 
 
4. Has McCallum failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
sentencing discretion? 
 
5. Has McCallum failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence? 
 
 
 
 
 7 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
McCallum Has Failed To Demonstrate That The State Presented Insufficient 
Evidence To Support His Conviction For Felony Destruction Of Evidence 
 
A. Introduction 
McCallum contends that the state presented insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction for felony destruction of evidence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-
12.)  Specifically, McCallum asserts that the state did not present any evidence 
that the investigation associated with the information on McCallum’s phone was a 
felony investigation.  (Id.)  McCallum’s claim fails because the state presented 
evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer that McCallum knowingly 
destroyed evidence of a felony investigation, and because the jury was 
specifically instructed that a lewd conduct investigation is a felony investigation.    
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 
Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987).  In conducting this review 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.  Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 
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Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072.  Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn 
from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict.  Miller, 
131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which A Rational Trier Of 
Fact Could Infer That McCallum Destroyed Evidence To Conceal It From 
A Felony Investigation.  In Any Event, McCallum Stipulated That A Lewd 
Conduct Investigation Is A Felony Investigation, And The Jury Was So 
Instructed 
 
Idaho Code § 18-2603 provides that an individual commits the crime of 
felony destruction of evidence when he “willfully destroys, alters or conceals” 
evidence knowing that the evidence “is about to be produced, used or discovered 
as evidence upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation” that “is criminal 
in nature and involves a felony offense.”   
In State v. Yermola, 159 Idaho 785, 367 P.3d 180 (2016), the Idaho 
Supreme Court clarified what evidence is required for the state to prove that a 
defendant’s destruction of evidence relates to an investigation that “involves a 
felony offense,” and thus, constitutes felony, rather than misdemeanor, 
destruction of evidence.  The Court first held that the offense of felony 
destruction of evidence does not require proof that the evidence destroyed tends 
to demonstrate the commission of a felony, it only requires proof that the 
defendant knows that the evidence was about to be discovered in an 
investigation that, as the language of the statute provides, “involves a felony.”  
Yermola, 159 Idaho at __ n.2, 367 P.3d at 182 n. 2 (abrogating State v. Peteja, 
139 Idaho 607, 83 P.2d 781 (Ct. App. 2003).)  The Court further held that in order 
to prove that an investigation “involves a felony,” the state must prove that the 
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“subject criminal offense” of the investigation is a felony offense.  Id. at ___, 367 
P.3d at 182-184.  The Court concluded that the state failed to present any 
evidence at Yermola’s trial that the subject criminal offense in that case was a 
felony offense, and that identifying the subject offense as “Grand Theft” in the 
jury instructions did not constitute such evidence.  Id. at ___, 367 P.3d at 184. 
While it acknowledges Yermola, the state asserts that there was sufficient 
evidence presented at the jury trial in the present case from which a rational fact-
finder could reasonably infer that the investigation into McCallum’s sexual 
relationship with 13-year-old A.M. was an investigation that involved a felony 
offense.  Jurors are permitted to make reasonable inferences regarding the 
evidence presented to them, and the state is not required to present evidence 
conforming to the specific wording of the criminal statute.  See State v. 
Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971, 975, 354 P.3d 1186, 1190 (2015); State v. Herrera–
Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998).  In this case, it 
was reasonable for the jury to infer that the investigation into A.M.’s allegation 
that she had sex with McCallum in his yard was an investigation that involved a 
felony offense, rather than a misdemeanor offense.  Further, because the state 
presented substantial evidence that McCallum destroyed evidence relating to the 
investigation of an offense (lewd conduct) which is a felony, McCallum has failed 
to demonstrate error. 
Additionally, in the present case, unlike in Yermola, the jury was 
specifically instructed that “[t]he investigation of Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Under Sixteen is a felony investigation authorized by law.”  (R., Vol. II, p.353; 
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Trial Tr., p.377, Ls.14-16.)  McCallum expressly declined to object to this 
instruction.1  (Trial Tr., p.367, Ls.19-25.)  Therefore, the parties essentially 
stipulated that the “subject criminal offense” in this case was a felony.    
There was no reason for the state to present specific evidence at trial that 
lewd conduct was a felony offense when McCallum ultimately stipulated to the 
fact that it was, and when the jury was so instructed.  Therefore, even if the state 
failed to present evidence from which a rational fact-finder could conclude that 
lewd conduct with a minor under 16 was a felony, such evidence was 
unnecessary in this case. 
Sufficient competent evidence was presented at trial from which a rational 
fact-finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the subject criminal 
offense associated with McCallum’s destruction of evidence was a felony 
offense.  In any event, the jury was specifically instructed that a lewd conduct 
investigation was a felony investigation.  This Court should therefore affirm 
McCallum’s conviction for felony destruction of evidence.2 
 
 
                                                          
1 While the district court initially identified this instruction as “No. 18,” the court 
ultimately re-numbered the instructions (see Trial Tr., p.368, Ls.10-22), after 
which, Instruction No. 18 became No. 17 (R., Vol. II, p.353). 
 
2 Because McCallum does not contend that the evidence for felony destruction of 
evidence was lacking regarding any element of the crime other than whether the 
subject criminal offense of the investigation was a felony offense, this Court 
should, if it concludes that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support this element, vacate the judgment of conviction and instruct the district 
court to sentence McCallum on the related I.C. § 18-2603 misdemeanor offense.  
See Yermola, 159 Idaho at __, 367 P.3d at 184.    
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II. 
McCallum Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Admitting The Text Messages Into Evidence 
 
A. Introduction 
McCallum contends that the district court abused its discretion by 
admitting certain text messages between McCallum and A.M. into evidence at 
the trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-23.)  McCallum’s argument fails because the 
text messages were relevant for purposes other than demonstrating criminal 
propensity, and because the probative value of the messages was not 
substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice.  Further, even if the 
court erred in admitting the challenged text messages, any such error was 
harmless in light of the other evidence of McCallum’s guilt presented at trial.  
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
Relevance is a question of law reviewed de novo, while balancing under 
I.R.E. 403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 
190, 254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011).  Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are also 
reviewed under a bifurcated standard: whether the evidence is admissible for a 
purpose other than propensity is given free review while the determination of 
whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its 
potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).  
In reviewing a trial court’s discretionary decision, this Court evaluates 
whether the trial court correctly perceived the decision as discretionary, whether 
the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with 
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legal standards, and whether the court exercised reason in making its decision.  
Norton, 151 Idaho at 190, 254 P.3d at 91.      
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Admitting The Text 
Messages Into Evidence 
 
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant.  I.R.E. 401, 402.  Evidence 
that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has 
any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be 
without the evidence, is relevant.  State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d 
807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989).  “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove a defendant’s criminal propensity.  However, such evidence 
may be admissible for a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).”  
State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations 
omitted).  Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be admitted 
to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.  I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 
845 P.2d 1211 (1993).  In Grist, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court set forth a two-
tiered analysis to determine the admissibility of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b).  
State v. Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 138, 267 P.3d 721, 725 (Ct. App. 2011).  “The 
first tier involves a two-part inquiry:  (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to 
establish the prior bad acts as fact; and (2) whether the prior bad acts are 
relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than 
propensity.”  Id. (citing Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188).   
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The second step in a 404(b) analysis involves a determination of whether 
the evidence, although relevant, should be excluded because the danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.  State v. Sheahan, 
139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003).  Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, 
relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the district court’s discretion, the danger 
of unfair prejudice -- which is the tendency to suggest a decision on an improper 
basis -- substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.  State v. 
Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 
651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 
656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993).  As previously explained by the Idaho 
Supreme Court:  “Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  The rule 
suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence.”  State v. 
Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in 
original).   
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely 
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party’s case.  See State v. 
Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) (“Certainly that evidence 
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is 
demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in 
prejudice to a defendant.”).  Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that 
is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis.  Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908.  As long as the 
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evidence is relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant’s character 
and its probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by 
the probability of unfair prejudice, it is not error to admit it.  State v. Cross, 132 
Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999). 
In this case, prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to introduce 
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  (R., Vol. II, pp.257-270, 281-301.)  Among the evidence 
the state sought to admit were various text messages between McCallum and 
A.M. sent between June and July 2014.  (R., Vol. II, pp.257-270, 281-301.)  
Some of the text messages were sent prior to July 5-6, 2014,3 the evening the 
charged act of lewd conduct took place at McCallum’s residence, and some of 
the messages were sent after that evening.      
The following text messages,4 which were later admitted at trial, were sent 
before July 5-6, 2014: 
June 26, 2014, 1:25 p.m. 
McCallum: Ur good n I’ll still be here to help just can’t be saying 
some the stuff I was, Im 28 n was flirting with a 13 yr old which is 
not good plus I never got wat I was askin for so u obviously weren’t 
to interested anyway lol 
 
(State’s Exhibit 11.) 
 
June 28, 2014, 1:28 a.m. 
 
McCallum: That ages are only numbers 
 
                                                          
3 A.M. testified that she left her grandmother’s house to go to McCallum’s house 
between 11:30 p.m. and midnight on July 5, 2014, and that she returned at 
approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 6, 2014.  (Trial Tr., p.155, L.23; p.169, Ls.9-22.) 
 
4 The state quotes all of the text messages verbatim, without corrections to 
spelling, grammar, capitalization, or punctuation.  
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(State’s Exhibit 9.) 
 
June 28, 2014, 10:47 a.m. 
 
McCallum: My whole issue of trust would come in the form of 
gossip…I know I wouldn’t be saying anything to ANYONE lol could 
I trust the same with u? 
 
(State’s Exhibit 10.) 
 
The following text messages, which were later admitted at trial, were sent 
after July 5-6, 2014:  
July 10, 2014, 11:08 AM – 11:36 a.m. 
 
McCallum: I’m picky n Ur a good pick that’s just how it is 
 
McCallum: Believe it or not Ur the only chick I’m talking to today 
 
McCallum: So Ur feinding for a lil more of the big deal huh? 
 
McCallum: I think it’s great looking…Pretty face perky tits great ass 
and tight sweet lil pussy Mmmmhmmm 
 
(State’s Exhibits 5-8.) 
 
July 12, 2014, 2:03 a.m. 
 
McCallum: I felt Ur pussy…doesn’t seem like you give it up ever lol 
n I was thinkin more damn Ur fun 
 
(State’s Exhibit 4.) 
 
July 12, 2014, 8:00 a.m.– 9:00 a.m.5 
 
McCallum: Y not?  
 
McCallum: Y. 
                                                          
5 State’s Exhibit 1 contains a “Column1” which indicates the actual time that each 
text message was sent.  This information was converted from the time data 
extracted from the phone.  (Trial Tr., p.341, L.8 – p.344, L.3.)  Additionally, for 
clarity, the state quotes these text messages in chronological order, rather than 
in the reverse-chronological order that they were arranged by on the exhibit.  
(See State’s Exhibit 1.)  
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A.M.: Y not what ? 
 
McCallum: U said it wasn’t for me 
 
A.M.: Yeah.  That text.  Other than that its all yours. ;) 
 
McCallum: Where’s my pic? :( 
 
A.M.: You can wait. 
 
McCallum: Then u can to ;-) 
 
A.M.: :( You cant do that.  Thats not fair!  That didn’t happen last 
time! Nd we still did it. 
 
McCallum:  Yup I know but u keep teasing me 
 
A.M.: No im not. 
 
McCallum:  Remember the here it Is come get it pics lol 
 
McCallum:  You told me u would :( 
 
A.M.: Yeah.  U said I didnt! 
 
A.M.: Nd I was talking future wise . 
 
McCallum: I wanted u to 
 
McCallum: :( 
 
McCallum: Imma cry 
 
A.M.: Mhmmmm sure. 
 
McCallum: I am very sad 
 
A.M.: Why? 
 
McCallum: Cause Ur body looks so amazing n I can’t see it 
 
A.M. (to mother): Can u pick me up at 9:15.  Cause we have to 
drop off [A.M.’s friend] somewheref 
 
McCallum: I’m pouting now 
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A.M.: That’s a lieeeee.  Plus wouldn’t you rather hold my amazing 
body and caress it instead? ;) 
 
McCallum: Imma do that also 
 
McCallum: But I really am sad :( 
 
A.M.: Awh.  Well you could be sad all you want but it aint going to 
get you anywhere. 
 
McCallum: Why u gotta be mean…U know the great sex is worth it 
;) 
 
A.M.: Cause im a bitch.(: and I know its worth it. ;) 
 
McCallum: maybe I should Put it in Ur butt lol ;) 
 
A.M.: Aint nobody will be happy with that one sweetheart. (; 
 
McCallum: Who u referring to? 
 
A.M.: Who do you think? 
 
McCallum: U? 
 
A.M.: there ya go sweetie. ;) 
 
McCallum: I’d be easy 
 
A.M.: Mhmmm sure. 
 
McCallum: Watcha mean? 
 
A.M.: nothing nevermind. 
 
McCallum: I would let you push on it n control the speed n depth 
 
A.M.: Oh really?  I like being in control! ;) 
 
A.M. (to mother): Im here 
 
McCallum: Ur lol ass is virgin huh 
 
McCallum: Lil* 
 
A.M. (to mother): K hold on. 
 18 
 
A.M.’s mother: Now! 
 
A.M.: Why would it not be? 
 
McCallum: Idk lol ur naughty 
 
A.M.: oh really? 
 
McCallum: Lol I don’t know war u have n haven’t done lol I just 
know I was Ur second time in that sweet tight pussy 
 
McCallum Wat* 
 
A.M’s mother: U got 30seconds! 
 
(State’s Exhibit 1.) 
 
At a pretrial hearing, McCallum objected to the admission of these text 
messages.  (6/19/15 Tr., p.31, Ls.20-25.)  The district court concluded that the 
text messages were admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) because they were relevant 
for purposes other than demonstrating criminal propensity; and that the probative 
value of the messages was not substantially outweighed by the potential for 
unfair prejudice pursuant to I.R.E. 403.  (6/19/15 Tr., p.32, L.1 – p.33, L.10.)   
The district court qualified its ruling by noting that the state still had to lay 
adequate foundation for the text messages, and that a limiting instruction might 
be appropriate.  (Id.)  The state ultimately laid adequate foundation for the text 
messages, and each message was admitted into evidence at trial.  (State’s 
Exhibits 1, 4-11.)  McCallum later declined to request a limiting instruction.  (Trial 
Tr., p.382, L.5 – p.383, L.6.)   
On appeal, McCallum contends that “any texts after July 6, 2014 that did 
not explicitly discuss acts that had already occurred could not be relevant to 
prove the lewd conduct charge.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.22.)  Therefore, McCallum 
 19 
 
does not appeal the admission of the portion of the text message exchange from 
July 12, 2014, that specifically references McCallum’s and A.M.’s sexual activity 
that occurred on July 5-6, 2014.  (Appellant’s brief, p.19.)  Nor does McCallum 
assert on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to establish the “other acts” 
evidenced by the text messages.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.12-23.)  A review of 
the record supports the district court’s decision to overrule McCallum’s objection 
and to admit each of the submitted text messages into evidence.    
In State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 590-591, 38 P.3d 625, 628-629 (Ct. 
App. 2001), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that evidence of Scovell’s 
uncharged incidents of sexual misconduct with the same victim who was the 
subject of the indictment was relevant and did not violate I.R.E. 404(b).  The 
Court of Appeals noted that there were “[a]dditional cases affirming the 
admission of evidence of the defendant’s prior or subsequent uncharged sexual 
misconduct with the same victim.”  Id.  (citing State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 256, 
899 P.2d 959, 966 (1995); State v. Lewis, 123 Idaho 336, 350–351, 848 P.2d 
394, 408–409 (1993); and State v. Hansen, 127 Idaho 675, 680, 904 P.2d 945, 
950 (Ct. App. 1995)).   
Subsequently, in Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified  the scope of 
I.R.E. 404(b) as it pertains to the admissibility of evidence of sexual misconduct 
admitted for the purposes of establishing a “common scheme or plan” of abuse, 
or for demonstrating the credibility of a victim.  Grist, 147 Idaho at 51-55, 205 
P.3d at 1187-1191.  The Court emphasized that “trial courts must carefully 
scrutinize evidence offered as ‘corroboration’ or as demonstrating a ‘common 
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scheme or plan’ in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that is 
merely probative of the defendant’s propensity to engage in criminal behavior.”  
Id. at 53, 205 P.3d at 1189.   
Grist (which analyzed the admissibility of evidence of Grist’s sexual 
misconduct with individuals other than the victim of the charged conduct), 
therefore partially overruled several Idaho cases which had interpreted I.R.E. 
404(b) as more broadly permitting the state to present evidence of defendants’ 
prior uncharged sexual misconduct.  However, Grist did not abrogate the general 
underlying principle of Scovell and related cases that evidence of sexual 
misconduct involving the same victim, especially when the other misconduct is 
close in time to the charged conduct, is more likely to be admissible for non-
propensity purposes than evidence of other types of uncharged conduct.  See 
also Noel v. Commonwealth, 76 S.W.3d 923, 931 (Ky. 2000) (“evidence of similar 
acts perpetrated against the same victim are almost always admissible for those 
[K.R.E. 404(b)] reasons.”); Lattimer v. State, 952 So.2d 206, 215-216 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2006) (Holding that evidence of other alleged sexual relations between 
defendant and victim, even though incident was not alleged in indictment, was 
admissible in sexual battery prosecution pursuant to M.R.E. 404(b), since it 
involved same victim in issue).  Further, Grist did not eliminate the state’s ability 
to admit evidence of a defendant’s uncharged sexual misconduct for a 
permissible I.R.E. 404(b) purpose as long as the evidence actually “serves its 
articulated purpose.”  State v. Osterhoudt, 155 Idaho 867, 872, 318 P.3d 636, 
641 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Grist, 147 Idaho at 55, 205 P.3d at 1191).     
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In this case, with respect to the felony destruction of evidence charge, the 
admitted text messages were plainly relevant for the permissible I.R.E. 404(b) 
purposes of proving that McCallum had the motive and intent to perform a factory 
reset on his phone in order to attempt to conceal evidence of the nature of his 
relationship with A.M. from law enforcement.  In fact, where the state faced the 
burden of proving that McCallum destroyed the text messages with the specific 
intent to conceal them from law enforcement, the state submits that it was 
entitled to introduce the text messages themselves into evidence, to demonstrate 
that they would be of interest to law enforcement.  Each of the admitted text 
messages was relevant for this purpose.      
Additionally, with respect to the lewd conduct charge, the admitted text 
messages illustrated the flirtatious and sexually intimate nature of McCallum’s 
relationship with A.M.  The messages were sent within weeks of the sexual 
misconduct for which McCallum was charged.  As the district court concluded 
(6/19/05 Tr., p.32, Ls.6-21), this tended to prove McCallum’s motive and intent in 
committing the crime of lewd conduct.   
The text messages also corroborated much of A.M.’s trial testimony.  A 
witness’ credibility is always relevant.  State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 503, 988 
P.2d 1170, 1177 (1999); Osterhoudt, 155 Idaho at 874, 318 P.3d at 643.  
Further, in this case, in light of A.M.’s detailed testimony regarding the lewd 
conduct (Trial Tr., p.155, L.8 – p.169, L.10), credibility was a central issue for the 
jury’s consideration.  The text messages were consistent with the direct 
examination testimony of A.M., who described how her relationship with 
 22 
 
McCallum evolved from him being an “older brother figure,” to flirtations, to 
ultimately culminating in sexual activity.  (Trial Tr., p.145, L.5 – p.169, L.10.)   
Additionally, as the district court properly concluded (6/19/05 Tr., p.32, 
L.25 – p.33, L.4), the probative value of the evidence for the above purposes was 
not substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice.  The potential 
for unfair prejudice was particularly limited in this case because, unlike in many 
other I.R.E. 404(b) cases which analyze the admissibility of evidence of a 
defendant’s prior sexual misconduct, the challenged texts do not actually 
reference any other sexual activity occurring between A.M. and McCallum.  
Instead, in the challenged text message exchanges, A.M. and McCallum 
discussed the age gap between them, McCallum’s trust issues, and McCallum’s 
desire to engage in future sexual activity with A.M.  While these matters were 
probative in terms of demonstrating McCallum’s motive and intent to engage in 
lewd conduct and to destroy evidence, for providing context for the sexual 
relationship between McCallum and A.M., and for corroborating A.M.’s trial 
testimony, they did not create any significant risk that the jury would reach its 
verdict on some improper basis. 
McCallum has failed to show that the district court erred in concluding that 
the text messages were relevant for purposes other than demonstrating criminal 
propensity, and that the probative value of the messages was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  This Court should therefore affirm 
McCallum’s convictions for lewd conduct and felony destruction of evidence. 
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D. Even If The District Court Erred In Admitting The Text Messages, Any 
Such Error Was Harmless 
 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected ….”  I.R.E. 103(a).  
See also I.C.R. 52 (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”).  “The inquiry is whether, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even 
without the admission of the challenged evidence.”  State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 
664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).   
In this case, even if the district court erred in admitting some or all of the 
challenged text messages, any such error was harmless in the circumstances of 
this case.  For similar reasons as discussed above as to why the risk of unfair 
prejudice from the admission of the challenged text messages was limited, 
exclusion of the messages also would not have resulted in an acquittal.  The 
challenged messages do not reference or contain admissions to any sexual 
activity actually engaged in by McCallum and A.M.  It is unlikely that, in a trial 
which contained testimony from A.M., and text message admissions from 
McCallum that he had engaged in sexual activity with A.M., the jury’s verdicts 
actually turned on the challenged text messages that did not reference such 
activity. 
For these reasons, and in light of the other evidence of guilt as described 
in the Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings of this brief, and as 
summarized by the prosecutor in her closing argument (Trial Tr., p.386, L.22 – 
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p.396, L.1; p.399, L.16 – p.401, L.11), the district court’s admission of the text 
messages in this case, if error, was harmless. 
 
III. 
The Doctrine Of Invited Error Precludes McCallum’s Contention That The District 
Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Probation And Executing The Sentence 
Previously Imposed Upon His Conviction For Aiding And Abetting The Delivery 
Of A Controlled Substance 
 
A. Introduction 
McCallum contends that the district court abused its discretion by revoking 
his probation and executing the sentence previously imposed upon his conviction 
for aiding and abetting the delivery of a controlled substance.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.23-24.)  McCallum’s argument is precluded on appeal because he invited any 
error by recommending the very probation violation disposition that was imposed 
by the district court.  In any event, McCallum has failed to demonstrate that the 
district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation.  
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
 The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1021, 842 P.2d 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1992).   
 
C. McCallum’s Claim Of Error Is Barred By The Invited Error Doctrine 
 
“The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an 
error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error.”  Norton, 
151 Idaho at 187, 254 P.3d at 88 (citing State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 
864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)). The purpose of the invited error doctrine is 
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to prevent a party who “caused or played an important role in prompting a trial 
court” to take a particular action from “later challenging that decision on appeal.”  
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999). “One may not 
complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in.”  Norton, 151 Idaho at 
187, 254 P.3d at 88 (citing State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 
460 (1985); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 
1998)). 
In this case, at the sentencing/probation violation disposition hearing, 
McCallum concurred with the recommendation of the state that his probation in 
the delivery case be revoked, and that his sentence in that case be run 
concurrently with his sentences for lewd conduct and destruction of evidence.  
(10/13/15 Tr., p.23, L.22 – p.24, L.7; p.27, Ls.6-9.)  Because the district court 
imposed the very probation disposition that McCallum requested (R., Vol. I, 
pp.176-181; 10/13/15 Tr., p.41, L.11 – p.42, L.6), he cannot claim error in that 
determination on appeal.   
 
D. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Revoke Probation 
Even if this Court chooses not to apply the invited error doctrine, 
McCallum’s claim of error is still precluded because he cannot demonstrate an 
abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination.   
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 
115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 
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Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988).  In determining whether to 
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the 
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.  State v. 
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 
Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. 
In this case, the district court acted well within its discretion to revoke 
McCallum’s probation on the delivery charge after he was convicted of lewd 
conduct and destruction of evidence, and after he additionally admitted to 
violating his probation by associating with individuals with known histories of drug 
use.  (R. Vol. I, pp.105-110, 172.)  For these reasons, as well as those discussed 
below in Sec. IV regarding McCallum’s prior criminal history and lack of 
rehabilitative potential, McCallum has failed to demonstrate that the district court 
abused its discretion.  
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IV. 
McCallum Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its 
Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
McCallum contends that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.25-26.)  McCallum has 
failed to establish that the district court’s aggregate unified 25-year sentence with 
five years fixed for lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and felony destruction of 
evidence is excessive considering the objectives of sentencing, the nature of the 
crime, and McCallum’s extensive criminal record. 
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007).  The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion.  Id. 
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is 
excessive.  Id.  To establish that the sentence is excessive, McCallum must 
demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was 
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and retribution.  Id. 
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In this case, prior to imposing sentence, the district court stated that it had 
considered the appropriate sentencing factors, and was particularly concerned 
with the protection of the community.  (10/13/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.3-7.)  The court also 
stated that it had considered whether probation or a retained jurisdiction was 
appropriate, as required by I.C. § 19-2521.  (10/13/15 Tr., p.40, Ls.5-25.)  A 
review of the nature of McCallum’s crimes, his extensive criminal history, and a 
review of the relevant sentencing materials supports the district court’s 
sentencing determination. 
As the district court noted (10/13/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.8-10; p.33, L.14 – p.36, 
L.4), McCallum has an extensive criminal history.  Since 2002, aside from the 
convictions in the present case, McCallum has obtained convictions for driving a 
vehicle without the owner’s consent, felony conspiracy, driving under the 
influence, possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, contempt of court, inattentive driving, driving without privileges, 
unlawful taking of game, and public intoxication.  (9/25/15 PSI, pp.5-8.)  
McCallum’s PSI also lists numerous prior probation violations.  (Id.)  Further, 
McCallum was already on probation for aiding and abetting the delivery of 
controlled substances at the time of his arrest on the lewd conduct and 
destruction of evidence charges.  (R., Vol. I, pp.91-127.)     
The nature of McCallum’s crimes supports the district court’s sentencing 
determination.  McCallum found his victim and initially built their relationship at 
Narcotics Anonymous meetings, where A.M.’s parents had attempted to help her 
address her drug issues.  (10/13/15 Tr., p.31, Ls.8-16.)  As the PSE investigator 
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observed (9/29/15 PSI, pp.19-20), McCallum’s behaviors in pursuing a sexual 
relationship with A.M. were particularly disturbing as they “were not impulsive but 
manipulative in nature.”  The district court discussed how victims of A.M.’s age 
are particularly vulnerable to older males who, in a predatory manner, 
demonstrate a romantic interest in the child.  (10/13/15 Tr., p.31, L.17 – p.33, 
L.13.)     
McCallum’s crimes had a significant impact on A.M. and her family.  
During the sentencing hearing, A.M.’s mother described how their “lives [had] 
been turned upside down”; and how A.M. threatened suicide, cut herself, and 
“started having angry outbursts and severe hostility” in the time since McCallum’s 
criminal conduct.  (10/13/15 Tr., p.8, L.2 – p.10, L.19.)   In a written statement 
read at the sentencing hearing, A.M. described how McCallum’s conduct 
negatively impacted her life – she was ashamed to go to school, had trouble 
sleeping, blamed herself for what happened, had difficulty trusting others, and 
lost self-esteem.  (10/13/15 Tr., p.11, L.8 – p.13, L.3.)    
McCallum was evaluated by two psychosexual evaluators, both of whom 
concluded that McCallum was a moderate risk to re-offend.  (10/13/15 Tr., p.36, 
Ls.5-11; 8/10/15 Evaluation, pp.1-2, 13-14; 9/8/15 Evaluation, pp.1-2, 42.)  One 
of the evaluators concluded that McCallum has an antisocial personality disorder 
and “can be expected to have some difficulty following rules and following the 
conditions of a supervised release.”  (8/10/15 Evaluation, p.13.)  The other 
evaluator noted McCallum’s “antisocial, narcissistic, and paranoid personality 
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characteristics,” and concluded that McCallum was “less amenable for sexual 
offender treatment than most sexual offenders.”  (9/8/15 Evaluation, pp.1-2, 42.)   
The district court’s aggregate unified 25-year sentence with five years 
fixed for lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and felony destruction of evidence 
was entirely reasonable in light of the objectives of sentencing, the nature of the 
crime, and McCallum’s extensive criminal history.  McCallum has therefore failed 
to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
 
V. 
McCallum Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Denying His I.C.R. 35(b) Motion For Reduction Of Sentence 
 
A. Introduction 
McCallum contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.26-27.)   
McCallum has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in declining to 
reduce his sentence.   
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial of 
the motion for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 
P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  To prevail on appeal, McCallum must “show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  
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C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Deny McCallum’s 
I.C.R. 35(b) Motion For Reduction Of Sentence 
 
McCallum filed an I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence 
approximately three months after his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct and 
felony destruction of evidence was entered.  (R., Vol. II, pp.408-409.)  McCallum 
did not provide any evidence or supporting documentation with the motion, but 
asserted that his “previous employers” agreed to re-employ him upon his release, 
and that his parents “continue to offer him a place to stay and they will assist him 
to complete any treatment he is required to attend.”  (Id.) 
The district court denied the I.C.R. 35(b) motion.  (R., Vol. II, pp.414-420.)  
After citing the standards applicable to an I.C.R. 35(b) motion determination, the 
district court reviewed the rationale behind its initial sentencing determination.  
(Id.)  The court reasonably concluded that its sentence fulfilled the appropriate 
sentencing objectives and that McCallum failed to present any new information 
that rendered that sentence excessive.  (Id.) 
A review of the record supports the district court’s determination.  The fact 
that McCallum’s parents supported him was already known to the court at the 
time of the initial sentencing.  (See 9/29/15 PSI, pp.23-31.)  Additionally, 
McCallum had already asserted to the presentence investigator, prior to 
sentencing, that he would still have employment with his former employers upon 
release.  (9/29/15 PSI, p.13.)  Thus, McCallum’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion contained 
no new information whatsoever. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McCallum’s I.C.R. 
35(b) motion to reduce his sentence under the circumstances of this case.   This 
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Court must therefore affirm the district court’s order denying McCallum’s I.C.R. 
35(b) motion for reduction of sentence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction imposed upon the jury verdicts finding McCallum guilty of lewd 
conduct with a minor under 16 and felony destruction of evidence, the district 
court’s order revoking probation in McCallum’s delivery of a controlled substance 
case, and the district court’s order denying McCallum’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion for 
reduction of sentence. 
 DATED this 22nd day of November, 2016. 
 
 
 
       _/s/ Mark W. Olson______ 
 MARK W. OLSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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